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to

establish

the National
her

right to
receive payments under the policy after the government had denied
her right thereto.'
The heirs at law of the insured were made thirdparty defendants and filed
ground that the beneficiary,
1

a counterclaim for the proceeds on the
although designated as aunt, was in fact

156 F. (2d) 24 (1946).

2 54 Stat. 1008, as amended by 5'

Stat. 657; 38 U. S. C. A. §§ 801-2.

3 Maulis v. United States, 56 F. (2d) 444 (1931), indicates that action in denying

a claim is sufficient ground to war-ant application to the courts. See also United
States v. Williams, 278 U. S. 255, 49 S. Ct. 97, 73 L. Ed. 314 (1929).
1'SO
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no relative of the insured hence was not entitled thereto. Plaintiff,
admitting the lack of blood relationship, then contended that, as she
stood in loco parentis to the deceased soldier for more than a year
prior to his entry into service, she was such a person as might be
named as beneficiary.'
It appeared that the insured, when 25 years
of age, had gone to live with the plaintiff, then 48, and had continued
to reside with her for over four years prior to his entrance into service
and the issuance of the policy in question. The District Court held
that the relationship of in loco parentis could not arise between adult
persons and awarded the proceeds to the insured's heirs. Upon appeal
by the plaintiff, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed on the ground that a liberal construction of the congressional
language forbade imposing a technical meaning upon the words "in loco
parentis" and, since there was no dispute as to the acts which established
that relationship, it ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
As the common definition for the phrase "in loco parentis" indicates that the person be one "who has put himself in the situation of a
lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation, without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption,"'
it has been held that the relationship could only exist between an adult
and a minor.6 That, at least, has been the tenor of the few Illinois cases
on the subject,' and would seem to be a necessary inference to be drawn
from any statutes dealing with related problems" or from analogous
4 At the time the policy was issued, the act declared:
"The insurance shall be
payable only to a ...
parent (including person in loco parentis if designated as
beneficiary by the insured) ...
The insured shall have the right to designate the
beneficiary . . . but only within the classes herein provided ..
" 54 Stat. 1008 at
1010, 38 U. S. C. A. § 802(g). The statute was subsequently amended to delete the
phrase "including person in loco parentis if designated as beneficiary by the insured" and substituted instead the words: "The terms 'parent,' . . . include . . .
persons who have stood in loco parentis to a member of the military or naval forces
at any time prior to entry into active service for a period of not less than one year."
See 56 Stat. 657 at 659, 38 U. S. C. A. §§ 801(f) and 802(g).
5 46 C. J., Parent and Child, § 174, p. 1334.
6 Ex Parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140, 34 Eng. Rep. 271 (1811).
See also 2 Williams on
Executors, 7th Am. Ed., p. 652, where emphasis is put on the idea that the person
in loco parentis must be one who "puts himself in the situation of the lawful father
of the child, with reference to the father's office and duty of making provision for
the child."
7 See Brush v. Blanchard, 18 Ill. 46 (1854). The later holding in Faber v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185 N. E. 255 (1933), indicates that the doctrine has
remained unchanged.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 4, § 1-1, dealing with adoption, restricts the proceeding
to cover adoption of minor children only. See also Brown v. Hall, 385 Il1. 260, 52
N. E. (2d) 781 (1944). For purpose of inheritance taxation, the phrase is expressly
limited to apply only if the "acknowledged" child was fifteen years of age or under:
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 120, § 375(5). See, however, In re Beach's Estate, 154 N.
Y. 242, 48 N. E. 516 (1897), where the court held that it was no bar to a tax
exemption that the relationship originated at a time when both parties were adults.
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decisions.' Such has also been the policy followed by the Veterans' Administration ° when applying the provisions of the War Risk Insurance
Act of 1917 as amended,1 1 or of the World War Veterans Relief Act of
1924.12

Prior to the instant case, only three decisions of the specific point
had been rendered by federal district courts. In Tudor v. United States"
the court said that the relationship was a legal impossibility where the
so-called "child" had reached majority and was capable of providing
for himself. Much the same result was achieved in Howard v. United
States."4 In the case of Meisner v. United States," however, an opposite
result was reached upon a set of facts where the insured, an adult at
the time the relationship arose, had designated the daughter of the socalled "parents" as beneficiary, describing her as his "sister."
Upon
finiding that the "parent-child" relationship existed, the court concluded
that the beneficiary was within the permitted class," for it said the
statute should be accepted "in accordance with common understanding"7
and, in the absence of express limitation, would permit the relationship
to arise between adults. The instant case has now brought the balance
even insofar as the decisions deal specifically with insurance policies
issued to veterans.'" A different result, however, has been reached in
cases involving policies issued by private companies. 19
It is probably desirable that such should be the case in view of the
20
liberal attitude the courts have generally taken in favor of servicemen
and the policy of liberalism which permeates the entire structure of war
risk insurance. Identical language in the present and prior acts ought
9 Bartholomew v. Davies, 276 Ill.
505, 114 N. E. 1017 (1917); Capek v. Kropik,
129 Ill. 509, 21 N. E. 836 (1889).
10 See Administrator's Decisions No. 536 and No. 675.
11 41 Stat. 371, Ch. 16, § 4, since repealed.
12 43 Stat. 607-8, § 3(5) ; 38 U. S. C. A. § 424(5).
'336 F. (2d) 386 (1929).
14 2 F. (2d) 170 (1924).
15 295 F. 866 (1924).
1 Although the policy was issued under the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917 as
amended, 41 Stat. 371, since repealed, Its provisions are analogous to the statute
here concerned.
17

295 F. 866 at 868.

18 Since the foregoing was written, another case from the

same district as the

Meisner case, that of Horsman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522 (1946), involving
the same general problem, has reached an identical result as that achieved in the
Meisner case and the instant one. The preponderance of weight, then, now favors
the instant case.
19 Hummel v. Supreme Conclave, Improved Order Heptasophs, 256 Pa. 164, 100 A.
589 (1917).
2OBoyette v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 66 (1936) ; United States v. Martin, 54 F.
(2d) 554 (1931) ; McNally v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 440 (1931) ; United States
v. Sligh, 31 F. (2d) 735 (1929) ; and United States v. Cox, 24 F. (2d) 944 (1928).
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to receive the same interpretation if the intention of Congress is to be
carried out.2 1

The generous policy underlying the National Service Life

Insurance Act calls for a breadth of interpretation of equal scope in
the absence of clear limitation on the point. Even if such were not the
case, there are equities in favor of a decision like the instant one for
it is common knowledge that little was done to give servicemen a complete education in the basic principles governing the choice of a beneficiary
or the consequences of making an improper choice. To deny relief to a
designated beneficiary who may have provided the sentimental, if not the
substantial, side of the parent-child relationship in order to favor a relative, would indeed place the law in the position of vouching for the
adage that "blood is thicker than water".
R. W. BEART.
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His ATTORNEY ONE NOT ADMITTED TO LOCAL PRACTICE-The defendants in

United States v. Bergamo,' residents of New Jersey, were seized by the
police while in Pennsylvania where they had gone to deliver counterfeit
gasoline and sugar ration stamps. They were indicated for a federal
offense' and were arraigned in a district court sitting in the latter state.
Defendants retained a New Jersey lawyer in good standing in his own
state to represent them. As the lawyer had not been admitted in the
particular district court, a member of the local bar was also retained as
resident associate counsel, 3 but the understanding was that the New
Jersey lawyer should be admitted specially 4 and would actively conduct
the defense. When the case was reached for trial, the district judge,
who happened also to be a resident of New Jersey and who seemingly
felt that some reflection might be cast by reason of the appearance of
New Jersey lawyers before him, announced that the defendants' principal
counsel and all like him, would not be permitted to appear in behalf of
their clients.' The resident counsel moved for a continuance because of
21

Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 169 U. S. 295, 18 S. Ct. 347, 42 L. Ed.

752 (1898).
1 154 F.

(2d) 31 (1946).

18 U. S. C. A. § 72.
3 Rule 3 of the U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa. provides: "Ally attorney . . . who is not a resident . . . shall in each proceeding in which he appears
"
have associate counsel, resident of and maintaining an office in the District ....
4 Rule 2, ibid., provides:
"Attorneys and counselors admitted to practice before
other courts, who do not possess the full qualifications required by the foregoing
rule, may be admitted specially for the purpose of a particular case."
5 The attorney remained in the courtroom but took no part in the proceedings
and, during the later stages became ill and was obliged to absent himself.
2
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his lack of familiarity with the case, but the motion was denied. After
a trial in which the resident counsel was said to have cross-examined in a
very competent fashion, the defendants were convicted. On appeal, a
contention by the defendants that they had been denied their constitutional right to be represented by counsel of their choice6 was sustained
when the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial, pointing out that while the district
court might have some discretion respecting the special admission of
counsel in civil cases, no such discretion was permitted in criminal cases.
There does not appear to be any case presenting the exact problem
involved in the instant case, although there is dictum in earlier cases
which tends to point in the direction of such a holding. 7 It has even
been stated that the "right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."
But there is also no
question but what the right cannot be insisted upon to the point where,
or in a manner which, to do so would obstruct orderly procedure of the
courts and prevent them from an exercise of their inherent powers.9
In view of the fact, then, that the defendants in the instant case had
been given advance notice that their chosen attorney would not be permitted to appear in their behalf' ° and had ample opportunity to choose
another from an adequate number of competent members of the local
bar, the trial court's ruling would seem sound.
The determination that the rule regarding special admission of at6 While U. S. Const., Amend. 6, merely states that the accused shall "have the
assistance of counsel," it has been held to intimate the right to counsel of his own
selection: Smith v. United States, 53 App. D. C. 53, 288 F. 259 (1923).
7 In Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55. 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527
(1932), it was indicated that the accused should be granted an opportunity to select
his own counsel before the court makes an appointment. Accord: Walker v. State,
194 Ga. 727, 22 S. E. (2d) 462 (1942) ; People v. Shiffman, 350 Ill. 243, 182 N. E.
760 (1932). If counsel is appointed, the court must see to it that defendants with
possible adverse interests are represented by separate attorneys: Glasser v. United
States, 315 U. S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). It is also error, according
to People v. Price, 262 N. Y. 410, 187 N. E. 298 (1933), to appoint counsel prior to
the time when the attorney selected by the defendant has withdrawn his appearance. The right of free choice in civil cases, but not involving choice of non-

resident counsel, is discussed in In re Mandell, 69 F. (2d) 830 (1934), and Kerling
v. G. W. Van Dusen & Co., 109 Minn. 481, 124 N. W. 235 (1910).
8 Murphy, J., in Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 at 76, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86
L. Ed. 680 at 702.
9 Smith v. United States, 53 App. D. C. 53, 288 F. 259 (1923). The trial court
there delayed starting the trial a seasonable amount of time because of the absence
of defendant's chosen attorney, then appointed counsel. The case had proceeded to
the point where a jury had been impanelled and a witness sworn before defendant's
original attorney arrived. Held: no error, because defendant was responsible for
the situation, in absence of showing of actual prejudice.
lo154 F. (2d) 31 at 33.
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torneys to practice had to yield to the defendants' right to counsel of
their own choice also involves an issue to which the Circuit Court of
Appeals appears to have given very little consideration. The question
might be restated to be one as to whether or not there are any limits
to the accused person's choice. He undoubtedly may reject the offer
of counsel and act as his own attorney, if his waiver is intelligently
made."
Unquestionably, his selection of a regularly admitted local attorney would be honored,'12 may even be ordered, if he was financially able
to provide for his own defense.'
When he seeks to retain an outside attorney, however, his desire comes into conflict with the well established
proposition that not every one may act as an attorney at law for another, the practice being limited to those who have been duly licensed
and admitted to practice. Certainly no court NWould regard itself bound
to listen to a chosen advocate whose license had been forfeited for misconduct despite the fact that he might possess the skill and training of
the most competent lawyer. Can the accused, then, force an attorney
upon a court merely because he happens to be in good standing elsewhere? Admitted that courts will generally grant special license for
a particular case in a spirit of comity, the intrinsic problem is whether
it can be forced to do so. Granted that a constitutional right would be
superior to any mere rule of court, especially if the latter was in conflict with the former, 14 is the accused person's right to counsel so broad
as the court in the instant case would indicate it to be?
In common-law days, the accused possessed no such right whatever
and counsel was permitted to speak in his behalf only if some question of
law was involved.' 5 Any present assurance of aid of counsel, then, is to
be found simply because of constitutional or statutory provisions. Viewed
from the angle of state practice, the case of Betts v. Brady 6 would indicate that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel is far from an
absolute one nor is it one which must be accorded in all criminal cases,
for it was there held unnecessary to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant in a non-capital felony case in the absence of local constitutional or statutory mandate. Not even the Fourteenth Amendment,
with its requirement of due process, was deemed enough to make the
assistance of counsel compulsory.
"1United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. (2d) 1006 (1943), and 138 F. (2d) 831 (1943).
12 People v. Price, 262 N. Y. 410, 187 N. E. 298 (1933).
13 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 730; State v. Steelman, 318 Mo.
628, 300 S. W. 743 (1927).
'4 People v. Davis, 357 Ill. 396, 192 N. E. 210 (1934).
'5 Sir William Withipole's Case, Cro. Car. 147, 79 Eng. Rep. 730 (1628).
16316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942), noted in 21 CMCAGO-KENT
LAW RLviEw 107.
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It is true that the Federal constitution grants the right to have the
aid of counsel in "all criminal cases," but the term "counsel" as used
therein can be understood to have only one meaning, i. e. a duly licensed
and admitted attorney at law. It was so understood at the time the constitution was adopted 1 7 and its meaning has not changed.1 8

The right

of the judiciary to select its own officers is equally well understood, even
to the point where admission to practice before the United States Supreme
Court does not confer the right to practice in the lower federal tribunals
or before the state courts.19 As an Illinois court once expressed the idea,
"It would be strange, indeed, if the court can control its own court room,
and even its own janitor, but that it is not within its power to inquire
into the ability of the persons who assist in the administration of justice
as its officers."20 The rule involved in the instant case, therefore, seems
to be perfectly consistent not only with the constitutional rights of the
accused but also with generally accepted tenets regarding admission to
practice in that it placed a discretion, by saying non-resident attorneys
"may be admitted," where it properly belonged, that is in the court
where the practice was to occur.
Without doubt, a denial of the right to appear as counsel for an
accused person on purely arbitrary grounds would violate constitutional
rights, for it has been said that the power to admit "is not an arbitrary
and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility

.

.

.

it is the duty of the

court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion." 2
It does not appear in the instant case, however, that the action of the
trial judge was reversed for an abuse of judicial discretion. Instead,
the Circuit Court of Appeals, giving a mandatory effect to the rule, said
that the circumstances "required" 'that the nonresident attorney be admitted specially, although the only circumstance of importance seemed
to be that such attorney happened to be the one of defendants' choice.
Carrying this interpretation to a logical conclusion, a district court might
find itself obliged to permit repeated appearances of a non-resident attorney, if he was chosen by a succession of persons charged with crime,
even though it might not be willing to grant him a general license.
17 3 BI. Com. 26 indicates that no man "can practice as an attorney in any of
those courts but such as is admitted and sworn an attorney of that particular

court."

18 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 6, p. 711, states: "Attorneys being officers of
the court, the power to admit applicants to practice law is judicial and not legislative, and is vested in the courts only."
19 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73. 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519 (1899). See also 1 Pollock
& 'Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 211 et seq.
20 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73 at 95, 54 N. E. 646 at 652.
21 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 6, p. 711.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

Perhaps the only alternative would be to adopt the idea expressed
in the civil case of In re Mandel 2 2 wherein a local rule forbade a trustee
in bankruptcy from selecting counsel from among those interested in the
case. The court there said: "Only in the rarest cases should the trustee be deprived of the privilege of selecting his own counsel, and reasons
which make it for the best interest of the estate the court select the attorney over the trustee's objection should appear in the record."23 If
that idea were adopted, the defendant's supposed constitutional right to an
attorney of his own choice, even one from outside the district, might be
accommodated in the average case but still leave the trial court some discretion in the matter if the reasons impelling a denial thereof were sufficiently meritorious to warrant spreading the same on the public records.
N. MCLEAN.
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AND
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CRIMINALS-

FOR CRIME WITHOUT
UNDER THE ILLINOIS

CRIMINAL ACT-A problem of first impression

THE STATE
HABITUAL

was presented to the

Illinois Supreme Court in the recent case of People v. Poppe.1
defendant there was
ously convicted of
Criminal Act,2 was
penitentiary under

The

found guilty of burglary and, having been previan offense within the purview of the Habitual
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment in the
a provision which directs that second offenders

shall be punished for the full term permitted for the last conviction.'
The defendant took the ease to the Supreme Court on error, 4 contending
that the conviction under the Habitual Criminal Act could not be
sustained since the previous offense of burglary had occurred in Ohio
and the Illinois statute did not expressly provide that convictions

without the state should be considered, as do similar statutes in many
other states.5 The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the sentence
F. (2d) 830 (1934).
60 F. (2d) 830 at 831. Italics added.
1394 111. 216, 68 N. E. (2d) 254 (1946).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 602.
The second conviction need not be for the
2269
23

same offense as the prior one, but must be for one of the crimes enumerated in the
statute: Kelly v. People. 115 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644 (1886).
3 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 84, fixes the punishment for burglary at imprisonment for any
term of years not less than one year or for life. A second conviction, pursuant to
the Habitual Criminal Act, would carry a life sentence.
4 Direct review is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 780
.
"Every
5 See, for example. Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927, § 9931, which provides:
person who, after having been convicted in this state of a felony or an attempt to
commit a felony, or under the laws of any other state or country . . . shall be
punished as follows .. " Italics added.
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of the lower court, holding that convictions without the state were
within the contemplation of the Illinois statute.
Although a search of the authorities reveals that many states have
statutes providing for enhanced punishment of subsequent offenders and
discloses that these acts have been the targets of repeated attacks on constitutional and other grounds, it yields few decisions which bear directly
About the turn of the
on the problem involved in the instant case.'
present century, it had been definitely established that a statute increasing the punishment for successive crimes is not unconstitutional as
imposing a penalty for crimes committed without the jurisdiction.7 But
long before that decision the principle seems to have been established
that a statute may impose an aggrevated penalty on repeated offenders,
so long as it expressly provides that crimes committed without the
That a
state be considered to determine the amount of punishment."
statute of this nature merely punishes more severely for the new crime
because of the prior offenses has been generally regarded as proper by
the courts.' Nor does the enumeration of specific felonies in such a statute violate due process requirements or operate to deny equal protection
of the laws, since such classification, although it results in discrimination,
One
has been held to be a proper matter for legislative discretion. 10
general requirement, however, seems to be that the foreign conviction
must be for such conduct as would amount to a felony under the laws of
1
the forum if it had been committed therein. '
Where the statute expressly provides that prior convictions, whether
within or without the state, shall be considered, the present problem is
not likely to arise, although objections to being charged with a foreign
conviction have been raised on a variety of grounds such as, for example,
the claim that the offense had been pardoned, 12 that the sentence had
6 See cases collection in annotations to People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451, 155
N. E. 737 (1927), in 58 A. L. R. 9; People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N. W. 245
(1931), in 82 A. L. R. 341; People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508, 71 P. (2d) 214 (1937),
in 116 A. L. R. 205; Re Jerry, 294 Mich. 689, 293 N. W. 909 (1940), in 132 A. L. R.
89; People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468 (1941),
in 139 A. L. R. 667.
7 McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 542 (1901).
s See reference to N. Y. Sess. Laws 1823, p. 179, § 6, in People v. Caesar, 1 Parker
Cr. R. (N. Y.) 645 at 648 (1855).
9 People v. Atkinson, 376 Ill. 623, 35 N. E. (2d) 58 (1941) ; State v. Findling, 123
Minn. 413, 144 N. W. 142, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449 (1913) ; State v. Moore, 121 Mo.
514, 26 S. W. 345, 42 Am. St. Rep. 542 (1894), affirmed in 159 U. S. 673, 16 9. Ct.
179, 40 L. Ed. 301 (1895).
10 People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 61 N. E. (2d) 361 (1945).
1:124 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 1960(d).
12 Pardon is apt not to relieve a defendant from the additional penalty: People
v. Biggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508, 71 P. (2d) 214, 116 A. L. R. 205 (1937), noted in 16
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
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159

been suspended,' 3 or that the prior offense was not identical in all of its
elements with one punishable as a felony in the prosecuting state. 14 Where
the statute does not contain such an express provision, judicial ruling
on the problem herein considered is likely to be required.1" As may be
expected, the cases are not in accord as to the effect to be given such a
statute. The court in the instant case concludes that the weight of
authority permits the inclusion of foreign convictions in a prosecution
under an habitual criminal act, and relies on decisions interpreting both
the Minnesota and the Illinois types of habitual criminal statutes. Since
the contention is not that a conviction in another state may not under
any circumstances be considered, but that it shall not be charged against
a defendant unless the statute expressly so provides, only the authorities
from states with statutes similar to the Illinois act need be examined.
Of the cases cited in support of the court's position, only two have
been found to be directly in point. One of the cases relied upon is that
of Fennen v. Commonwealth.6 There, an indictment had been returned
against the defendant charging him with the commission of a felony
and alleging that he had been twice previously convicted in Ohio, a sister
state. The life sentence of the lower court was sustained, but the case
is no authority for the proposition under examination for the defendant's objections went to the sufficiency of the language of the indictment
in that the laws of Ohio were not pleaded haec verba. No point was made
as to the admission of the Ohio convictions as such, doubtless for the
very good reason, not noticed by the Illinois court in the instant case,
that the Kentucky statute was not similar to the Illinois act but expressly
provided that convictions whether within or without the state might be
considered. 1 7 In the Texas case of Johnston v. State,' a conviction under
an habitual criminal statute similar to that of Illinois was upheld notwithstanding the fact that the prior convictions had taken place in Okla13 A defendant has been held properly convicted as a second offender despite the
fact that sentence on the previous conviction was suspended: People v. Wilson, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 395, 257 App. Div. 893 (1939), affirmed in 281 N. Y. 712, 23 N. E.

(2d) 542 (1939).

14 Substantial similarity in the offenses seems to be sufficient: State v. Young,
345 Mo. 407, 1.33 S. W. (2d) 404 (1939).
15 The Illinois statute has been in force since 1883; Laws 1883, p. 76. The issue
was raised once before in People v. Stack, 391 Ill. 15, 62 N. E. (2d) 807 (1945),
but as the habitual criminal count was nolle prossed there was no decision thereon.
16240 Ky. 530, 42 S. W. (2d) 744 (1931).
17 Carroll's Ky. Stat. 1930, § 1130, provides: "Every person convicted a second
time of felony, the punishment of which is confinement in the penitentiary, shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than double the time of the first conviction . . .
Judgment in such cases shall not be given for the increased penalty, unless the jury
shall find, from the record and other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state."
18 130 Tex. Cr. 524, 95 S. W. (2d) 439 (1936).
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homa. That result was foreshadowed by a decision of the Texas court,
rendered two years earlier, when it had permitted the inclusion of a
conviction in a federal court located within the state. 9 A case not mentioned in the opinion in the instant case, but one supporting the outcome,
is that of Wiese v. State.2" A Nebraska statute there concerned provided
that for a second or subsequent offense of chicken-stealing the offender
should be deemed to be guilty of a felony and should be punished accordingly. It was held that upon conviction for the offense of chickenstealing, an increase in the penalty could be imposed under the statute
because of a prior conviction for a similar offense in Iowa.
Opposed to the foregoing cases are decisions from several other respectable jurisdiction. In the early case of People v. Caesar,2' it was
held that the defendant could not be punished for petit larceny as a
second offender in New York, when the first larceny had been committed
in Massachusetts, since the particular statute was silent with reference
to offenses committed without the state. The court said that the penal
statutes of each state must be construed to be applicable only to offenses
committed within its own borders unless it affirmatively appear that the
intention was otherwise. 22

In Wiedner v. State,"
2
the defendant had had

remitted to him six hundred days of a prison sentence in the New Jersey
state prison. Subsequently, he was again committed to the state prison
by a federal district court sitting within the state for a crime against
the federal government. At the expiration of this term, he was taken
to serve out the remitted portion of the state sentence. It was held, however, that the provisions of the local act did not apply where the second
conviction was obtained in a federal court. Likewise, in Connecticut,
under a statute imposing a heavier penalty upon an offender who had
been twice before convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in a state prison
or penitentiary, it was held that three prior convictions with accompanying detention in a state prison in New York would support a conviction
as an habitual criminal, 24 but a confinement in a federal penitentiary
would not, for the word "state" in the phrase "in a state prison or
penitentiary" was regarded as qualifying the word "penitentiary" as
19 Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. 89, 74 S. W. (2d) 997 (1934). The court intimated that the exact point had not been passed on before. Apparently its attention
had not been directed to the decisions in Wiedner v. State, 59 N. J. L. 345, 36 A.
102 (1896), and State v. Delmonto, 110 Conn. 298, 147 A. 825 (1929). The Illinois
Supreme Court, since the determination of the instant case and in reliance thereon,
has also achieved the same result: People v. Gavalis, 395 Ill. 409, 70 N. E. (2d)
589 (1947).

20 138 Neb. 685, 294 N. W. 482 (1940).
211 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 645 (1855).
22 Accord: Commonwealth v. Stack. 20 Pa. Dist. R. 599 (1910).
23 59 N. J. L. 345, 36 A. 102 (1896).
24 State v. Riley, 94 Conn. 698, 110 A. 550 (1920).
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well as the word "prison. "25 The court held that since the statute was
highly penal it should be strictly construed, and that it was up to
the legislature to include a reference to a sentence in a federal peni28
tentiary if that was what was intended. Finally, in Lowe v. State,
a relatively recent case and one directly in point, the indictment charged
the defendant with possession of burglar tools in Georgia and alleged that
he had been previously convicted of burglary in Tennessee. It was held
that the habitual criminal act of Georgia was not applicable as the prior
conviction and confinement had occurred in another state.
These latter decisions seem to indicate that the majority rule, if one
could be said to exist, is to the effect that a conviction without the
state may not be made the basis for the application of the habitual criminal statute unless the same so expressly provides. Bearing in mind that
the primary rule for the interpretation of a penal statute is that it is
to be strictly construed in favor of the accused,27 certain decisions prior
to a recent amendment of the Illinois statute28 suggest that such a construction has previously prevailed in this state. Thus in one case the
defendant was found guilty of burglary and, having a prior conviction
of larceny of a motor vehicle against him, 29 he was sentenced as an
habitual criminal. It was held that the conviction for larceny of a motor
vehicle was not the same as one for grand larceny within the meaning
of the habitual criminal statute."0 In another case, that of People v.
Sarosiek,31 it was held that a larceny from the person, 32 in the absence
of a finding that the value of the property so taken exceeded $15, was
not a grand larceny 33 within the purview of the act,

4

despite the fact that

a larceny from the person is to be treated as the same as grand larceny
25 State v. Delmonto, 110
2650 Ga. App. 369, 178

Conn. 298, 147 A. 825 (1929).
S. E. 203 (1935), conforming to answer to a question
certified in 179 Ga. 742, 177 S. E. 240 (1934).
27 People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 46 N. E. (2d) 929 (1943).
28 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 573; I. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 602. The amendment
merely added to the list of offenses coming within the purview of the Habitual
Criminal Act.
29 That conduct constitutes a separate and specific crime according to Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 388a.
30 People v. Parker, 356 Ill. 301, 1.90 N. E. 358 (1934). But an election to indict
the defendant for grand larceny brings the prior conviction within the purview of
the act, according to People v. Crane, 356 Ill. 276, 190 N. E. 355 (1934), even
though the property stolen consists of an automobile.
31375 Ill. 631, 32 N. E. (2d) 311 (1941).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 387.
33 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 389. The term "grand larceny" is not expressly defined by
statute, but the courts have interpreted it to mean the theft of property of more
than $15 in value, thereby distinguishing it from petty larceny on the basis of
punishment.
34 It
is now enumerated as one of the habitual offenses by reason of an amendment added in 1941: Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 573.
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for purpose of punishment. 5 It would seem, then, that the court in the
instant case has departed from its own standards in failing to apply the
strict type of construction it has heretofore used.
There is, of course, a subsidiary rule that directs that a statute is
to be construed so as to give effect to the obvious intention of the legislature. 36 The court in the instant case said it saw an intention on the
part of the legislature to include a foreign conviction because of the
statutory direction that a "duly authenticated" copy of the record of a
former conviction and judgment of any court of record should serve
It pointed out that a tranas prima facie evidence of such conviction."
script of a judgment of a court within the state need only be certified
to be admissible in evidence, 3 hence the use of an authenticated copy
could refer only to an out-of-state conviction. However persuasive this
argument may be, it would appear, in the light of decisions from other
jurisdictions and by an application of the rule of strict construction,
that the present decision is at least questionable. As to the propriety of
the result, however, there is no dispute. It is fitting that a wrongdoer
who persists in his criminal conduct, whether at home or abroad, should
be socially isolated by confinement, the period of which ought to be
determined by the fact of his prior convictions and independent of the
place where they may have been obtained. But this should be a matter
for the legislature, which can express its views on the question in language
admitting of but one meaning.
J. E. GALT.

INFANTS-ACTIONS-WHETHER

OR

FAvoR OP A CHILD FOR PRENATAL

IN

NOT A CAUSE

INJURIES

OF

ACTION

INFLICTED UPON

EXISTS

IT-The

case of Bonbrest v. Kotz involved a re-appraisal of the question as to
whether or not an infant, after its birth, might maintain a suit against
the attending physician, upon a cause of action predicated on malpractice,
for injuries sustained in the process of removal from the mother's womb.
A motion for summary judgment, based upon the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action on behalf of the infant, was there
denied when the United States District Court concluded that the child,
being viable at the time the injury was inflicted, was sufficiently a person to have a standing in court and to possess the rights which attend
on all human beings, especially if the child survived to be born alive.
35

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 389.

36 Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 159, 40 S. Ct. 241, 64 L. Ed. 507
(1920).
37 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 603.
Ibid., Ch. 51, § 13.
165 F. Supp. 138 (194).
38
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The decision was admittedly one without precedent either in the
common law or in the jurisdiction of its determination, in fact was directly opposed to practically all recorded American cases dealing with
the point,2 and proceeded upon the concept that judges were free to mold
the common law to meet changing conditions or to keep pace with progress in the other sciences. The infection of that bold disregard for
fundamental doctrines such as was demonstrated recently in the case of
.Dailyv. Parker' would, therefore, seem to be spreading through the federal judiciary. Dean Pound's prophesy that the law was "entering
upon a new period of growth" 4 comes closer to accomplished fact.
Further novelty is projected into the case, however, by the idea
that viability rather than birth or conception is to be deemed the test
of human existence for the purpose of deciding whether the infant is a
person capable of claiming human rights with their corresponding duties.
The problem is not one of whether the mother can recover for injuries
sustained by her at the time of the child's birth,5 but whether the child
can recover in his own right.6 Only one similar case, a Canadian decision,7 has reached the same result and there it was achieved upon the
ground that (1) as the wrongful act might also constitute a crime against
the unborn child it was difficult to see why its separate existence could
not be recognized for purpose of redressing a tort, but (2) more likely
because the court felt that the recovery by the parents would leave a
residuum of injury for which compensation could not be had save at the
suit of the child. The tenor of the reasoning underlying the decision is
best exemplified by a quotation from the opinion. The court there said:
"If a right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without
any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's
2 See cases listed by the court, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 139, notes 1 to 4 inclusive.
The
court could have added Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. (2d) 446
(1939), noted in 27 Ill. B. J. 348, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1016; Ryan v. Public Service

Co-ordinated Transport, 18 N. J. Misc. 429, 14 A. (2d) 52 (1940) ; In re Robert's

Estate, 286 N. Y. S. 467 (1936) ; Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S. W. (2d)
(Tex. Civ. App.) 350 (1943). The only cases contra, from courts of inferior status,
are Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1939), predicated
upon a provision of the California code, and Kine v. Zuckerman, 4-Pa. D. & C. 227,
97 A. L. R. 1525 (1939).
3 152 F. (2d) 174 (1945), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 90.
4 Pound, "The Spirit of the Common Law" (Marshall, Jones & Co., Boston, 1921).
p. 181.
5 See, for example, Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
6 Recovery has been denied upon the theory that in the absence of contract with
the child there can be no duty owed to it: Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts. R. Co., 154
App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. S. 367 (1913) ; Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 28 Irish
L. R. 69 (1891). Expanding use of the doctrine of third-party beneficiary contracts
would nullify the argument underlying such cases.
7 Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 1933 Can. Sup. 456, 4 Dom. L. R. 337 (1933).
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fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and inconvenience
without any compensation therefor. "8
Whatever might have been the view of the civil law, 9 it is undoubtedly
true that the common law regarded a child en ventre sa mere, from the
moment of conception rather that that of viability, 10 as a person capable
12
of inheriting property" so long as the child was subsequently born alive.
The importance of such fictionalizing of personality can well be understood in the light of the then social significance of real property ownership and the feudal need for family perpetuation. At a time when much
land was held under fee tail tenure, fictions of that character would be
apt to be developed to prevent lapse of estates 1' but would be carried
no farther than the need required. It is not remarkable, therefore,
that the common law went no further than it did.
It is not so clear, however, that the unborn child was a person
within the contemplation of the criminal law, Blackstone to the contrary
notwithstanding. 4 More modern research has indicated that in commonlaw days such was not the case, 5 and abortion is generally treated as
criminal today not because of any common-law doctrines but by reason
of statutory prohibition.'0
There is, then, considerable uncertainty in
the supposed analogy between tort law and criminal law used to support
the instant case," and expressed as a qualified "if" underlying the
8 1933 Can. Sup. 456 at 464. 4 Dor.

L. R. 337 at 345.

9Dig. Just., lib. 1. tit. 5, § 26, does declare: "Q0t in utero gsnt, in toto paenc
iure civilli intelligenfur in. rerum natura esse." But it should be noted that the
statement is qualified by the adverb "almost" and talks of the unborn as "things"
rather than as "persons."
10 There is a medical distinction between an embryo, or foetus in its earliest
stages of development, and a viable foetus, or one which has reached such a stage
of development that it can live outside of the uterus: Encyclo. Americana, Vol. 10,
p. 283.
11 1 B1. Com., p. 130. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 164.
12Smith v. Fox. .53 Ont. L. R. 54, 3 Dom.L. R. 785 (1923); Doe v. Clarke. 2 H.
Bl. 399. 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (1795) ; Goodale v. Gawthorne, 2 S. & Giff. 375, 65 Eng.
Rep. 443 (1854).
'a Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital, 184 Ii1. 359, 56 N. B. 638 (1900).
14 It is stated, in 1 BI. Com.. p. 129, to be the law: "For if a woman is quick
with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in her womb: or if any one beat
her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this,
though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter."
15Rex v. Brain, 6 Car. & P. 349. 172 Eng. Rep. 1272 (1834). But see Rex v.
Senior, 1 Mood. 346, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832), as to criminal responsibility for
injury inflicted at time of birth.
16 See, for example, 43 Geo. III, c. 58; II1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 3.
' Judge McGuire, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 140, poses the query: "Why a 'part' of the
mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and person in that of. . .
crime?" The answer would seem to be that they are not to be so regarded in the
absence of a statute so declaring.
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comparable Canadian decision.' 8 When it is recalled that a tort is a
private wrong whereas a crime involves conduct offensive to the public
generally, there is still further reason for observing distinctions between
them which distinctions become clouded by drawing attempted analogies
such as was done in the instant case.
It must be said, then, that the law, as presently constituted, does not
support the holding in the instant case. Yet it is regrettable that no
remedy has been provided for situations like the one here involved, for
professional men should be penalized for their incompetence. A way out
has been indicated in California, for the code of that state declares that
a child "conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person,
so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent
birth."'

9

0
That provision was interpreted, in Scott v. McPheeters,'2
to

be sufficiently broad to permit suit, at the instance of the child, to recover for prenatal injuries inflicted upon it. Similar legislation enacted
elsewhere should prove sufficient to create a cause of action in favor of
the infant without the necessity of requiring judges to go beyond their
province in devising remedies to fit hard cases. If such laws existed,
it would be unnecessary to attempt distinctions between a child conceived
and one that had reached the stage of viability, thereby eliminating some
of the difficulty implicit in establishing a case like the instant one.
It would not, however, obviate other difficulties in proving that the
prenatal injury was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence
or lack of skill, a factor which has led some courts to repudiate attempts
to maintain such actions. 21 But difficulty in making proof, or the fact
that damages may be deemed too remote to permit recovery, are scarcely
reasons for denying the existence of a cause of action. Such things
should merely serve to challenge the law and lawyers to keep pace with
developments in other fields.
E. W. JACKSON.
isIn Montreal Tramways v. Leveille. 1933 Can. Sup. 456 at 464. 4 Dom. L. R. 337
at 344, the court notes: "... if the law recognizes the separate existence of the
unborn child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is difficult to see why it should not
also its separate existence for the purpose of redressing the tort." Italics added.
19 Deering, Cal. Civil Code, § 29.
2033

Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1939).

See note, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 549. In Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 97
A. L. R. 1525 (1936), the court relied upon the unique theory that the defendant's
neglect set in motion a harmful force which did not culminate in injury until the
moment of birth. While that rationale was adopted to defeat the argument that
the child was not in esse at the time of the wrong, hence could not sue, it might
prove helpful in establishing a prima facie case. Since imbecility, paralysis, loss of
function and the like are not normal incidents to natural birth under competent
handling of delivery, the existence thereof might be regarded as a type of res ipsa
loquitur.
21
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OR DESTRUCTION OF FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER IDENTIFYING RECORDS TAKEN

BY POLICE AT TIME OF ARREST-In the case of State ex rel. Mavity v.

Tyndall1 the Indiana Supreme Court had occasion to construe the effect of
a local statute2 which had created a State Bureau of Identification and
had provided for the securing, by local police, of photographs, fingerprints and the like of persons convicted of certain crimes or who were
well-known and habitual criminals. The statute required that such records
be retained to compose an identification system integrated with those of
other states and the one maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The statute was silent, however, as to what should be done with
the records in the event the accused had no previous criminal record
and was acquitted upon a proper hearing.

According to that case, the

relator, who had no criminal record except for one traffic violation, was
arrested for gaming and keeping a gaming device. Following customary
police practice, but against his will, relator's fingerprints were taken, he
was photographed, a specimen signature was obtained, and certain descriptive material was added. Three sets of these records were made;
one being retained at the local police headquarters, one being sent to the
state police central office, and the third filed with the federal bureau. The
criminal charges were subsequently dismissed. When relator sought the

return of these records, his request was refused. He then sought to mandamus the local officials to compel surrender or destruction of the records claiming that the exhibition thereof in a rogue's gallery invaded his
right of privacy. He conceded that the police had the right to secure
the records in the first instance for purpose of identification, to arrange
for his safekeeping pending trial or to aid in his recapture in case of
escape, but claimed such purposes were spent after his acquittal. Upon
finding that relator's photograph had been placed in a rogue's gallery
and had been viewed by members of the public attempting to identify
persons accused of committing other crimes, the Indiana Supreme Court
concluded that relator's right of privacy had been invaded and, as a consequence, it reversed a judgment sustaining a demurrer to his complaint.
It did indicate, however, that the retention of fingerprint records alone
would ordinarily give rise to no unfavorable publicity as such records
could be read only by experts.
Cases in point, either from Indiana or from other jurisdictions, are
comparatively rare. The earlier decisions denied relief, although on
1 - Ind. -, 66 N. E. (2d) 755 (1946).
2 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 47-846 et seq.

See also Acts 1945, Ch. 344, §§ 12-14.
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grounds unconnected with any right of privacy. More recent cases,
however, disclose a tendency to provide a remedy when an innocent person's right of privacy has been wrongfully invaded as by taking and
distributing identification records after arrest and before trial. The
first Indiana case, that of State ex rel. Burns v. Clausmier, for example,
was one in which the arrested person, after his discharge, sought to recover damages on a sheriff's bond for the taking of his photograph while
in custody on a charge of forgery. The court held that, as there was no
official duty on the part of the sheriff to take photographs for identification records and to publish them before conviction, there could be no
recovery on the official bond. The question of whether or not the sheriff
could have been held personally liable, as for the publication of a libel,
was not before the court and was not decided. With the passage of the
Indiana statute construed for the first time in the instant case, a different
result for similar litigation in that state might now well be obtained.
Early cases in New York also denied relief to persons seeking the
return or destruction of identification records. In Owen v. Partridge,
Police Commissioner,4 it was pointed out that "any invasion of one's
right to be let alone can be remedied only by a statutory enactment directed against the particular case.", An innocent man, in another case,
whose prison records were still on file after he had been acquitted of
first degree murder upon appeal, was also referred to the legislature.6
Relief was likewise denied, in Gow v. Binghamn,7 on the ground that mandamus was an improper remedy, although the court recognized that a
gross injustice had been committed in obtaining the identification records
prior to even a preliminary hearing.
In the Maryland case of Downs v. Swann,' the accused person
sought to obtain an injunction against the police officials but failed to
allege that the defendants were improperly planning to place his picture, after acquittal, in an existing rogue's gallery. Upon police denial
that it was their practice to so use such photographs unless the offender
was convicted or escaped custody, injunctive relief was denied. The court
did state, however, that police officers "have no right to needlessly or
wantonly injure in any respect persons whom they are called upon in
the course of their duty to arrest or detain, and for the infliction of any
such injury they would be liable, to the injured person, in the same manner
3 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541 (1900).
440 Misc. 415, 82 N. Y. S. 248 (1903).
540 Misc. 415 at 421, 82 N. Y. S. 248 at 253.
6 In re Molineux, 177 N. Y. 395, 69 N. E. 727, 65 L. R. A. 104 (.1904).
757 Misc. 66, 107 N. Y. S. 1011 (1907).
8111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909).
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and to the same extent that private individuals would be. "' Much the
same rationale has been followed in Arkansas ° and Washington.',
An attempt to resolve the conflict between the rights of society on
the one hand and those of the individual on the other may be observed
in the New Jersey case of Bartletta v. McFeeley, Commissioner of Public
Safety, 2 where the court refused to enjoin the police exhibition of the
accused's identification records, in the absence of any showing that
malice prompted the police to expose plaintiff to ridicule and disgrace,
on the ground that public safety required the exercise of a certain amount
of discretion on the part of police officials. Shortly thereafter a statute
was adopted requiring the immediate taking of photographs and fingerprints of a person arrested for an indictable offense as well as the forwarding of copies thereof to the state Bureau of Identification without
delay.3 As is the case with most such statutes, no mention was made
therein of the right of an accused person, if acquitted, to secure the surrender or destruction of these records. Under the circumstances, when
the plaintiff in the case of Fernicola v. Keenan14 asked for the surrender
of records because he was never indicted, the court again said the question of whether or not the records were to be retained was a question to
be decided by the police. In that regard, the chancellor said: "The taking of the fingerprints in the first place and the whole process of arrest
of a possibly innocent person are a humiliation to which he must submit
for the benefit of society. To the same end, the police are justified in
retaining such records, in certain cases, after an acquittal or a failure
of the Grand Jury to indict

.

.

.

On the other hand, when a man

of good repute has a false charge made against him and is cleared of
it, it seems to me that the police should destroy his fingerprints or photographs or remove them from the Rogues' Gallery. But in the absence of
the statute, discretion in the matter belongs to the police
for the court to make decision.15

.

.

It is not

Two later cases arising in New Jersey brought the problem into
sharper focus. In one of them, that of Jenkins v. McGovern," the arrested person obtained a temporary injunction restraining the sheriff
9 111 Md. 53 at 64, 73 A. 653 at 656.
10 Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 122 S. W. 115 (1909).
11 Hodgeman v. Olsen, Supt. State Reformatory, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
12107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (1930), affirmed in 109 N. J. Eq. 241, 156 A. 658
(1931).
13 Rev. Stat. N. J., Vol. II § 53:1-19.
14136 N. J. Eq. 9, 39 A. (2d) 851 (1944).
15 136 N. J. Eq. 9 at 10, 39 A. (2d) 851 at 851-2.
16 136 N. J. Eq. 563, 43 A. (2d) 526 (1945), reversed in - N. J. Eq. -, 45 A.
(2d) 844 (1946).
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from distributing the records, at least before verdict of guilty, to the
federal authorities, to the police of other states, and of other countries.
When the sheriff respected the temporary injunction, and also refrained
from acting as to other arrested persons, he was indicted for failure
to perform his duty. He then sought to prevent the prosecuting officials
from violating his right of privacy by photographing him and disseminating his identification records prior to conviction. 1" As the court felt
the mere taking of the photograph and fingerprint impressions before
conviction would do no harm, it did not enjoin such action. It did not,
however, have the same opinion about forwarding copies of such records
to other police before a verdict of guilty, and held that so much of the
statute as required the premature dissemination of such records violated
constitutional rights. 8
The improper display of a photograph in a rogue's gallery has also
been denounced in the recent Missouri case of State ex rel. Reed v. Harris"9
where pictures of the accused, who had no record of conviction for felony,
were taken while he was held for a traffic violation. When the accused,
contending that the statute provided merely for the taking and keeping of records of persons convicted of a felony whose convictions had
not been set aside or reversed,' 0 asked for an injunction, the state Bureau
of Identification sought a writ of prohibition to stop the trial judge from
entertaining that proceeding, but did not succeed on much the same
theory as that developed in New Jersey.
Two cases from Louisiana definitely uphold a right of privacy on
the part of an innocent person of such character as to warrant preventing the retention and distribution of pictures of the accused even though,
2
in each case, the plaintiff had been arrested on numerous occasions. 1
The reasoning behind both decisions rests on tlw fact that posting a
picture in a rogue's gallery and sending it to other jurisdictions as a
criminal record constitutes permanent proof of dishonesty which is unwarranted unless and until a conviction is obtained.
These are the only cases which have reached reviewing courts, but
further material may be gathered by examining the practices of police
officiais in making criminal identification files. The Illinois practice is
McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N. J. Eq. 24, 43 A. (2d) 514 (1945).
The statute was said to be an improper exercise of the police power in view of
the natural and inalienable rights belonging to every citizen: 137 N. J. Eq. 24 at
46, 43 A. (2d) 514 at 525.
19 348 Mo. 426, 153 S. W. (2d) 834 (1941).
20 Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., Vol. 12, § 4184.
2" Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905), affirmed in 117 La. 708,
42 So. 228 (1906) ; Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905), affirmed
in 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
17

18
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illustrative. Under the rules and regulations of the state Bureau of Identification, as well as of local police, it has become standard practice to
secure photographs, fingerprint impressions, Bertillon measurements, and
the like of virtually all persons arrested except those seized for traffic
violations and for juvenile offenders. Such information is kept in local
police and state files, is sent to the federal bureau and is made available
to the police of other states, if requested by them. Complaining witnesses are permitted to view photographs on file when attempting "to
identify offenders. While the Illinois statute provides for keeping these
records, it declares that they are not to be made public except where
necessary in the identification of persons accused of crime or, on trial,
22
where such persons have been previously imprisoned for prior offenses.
Petitions have, therefore, been filed in nisi prius courts seeking the surrender or destruction of such identification records where the accused
person has subsequently been discharged and, after due consideration
of the circumstances, such petitions have been allowed or denied on the
merits of each individual case. The matter has, however, been left on
no more firm foundation than that, not only in Illinois but in most of
the states whose statutes are silent on the point. In only ten instances
is there specific treatment on the subject, by requiring either the destruction of such records,2" their return to the accused person,24 or their
return upon request, 25 provided the accused person has been acquitted.
The need for adequate identification records to aid in the apprehension of criminals is recognized. In the discharge of their general duty
to protect the public, police officials may well have occasion to take photographs, fingerprints and the like of arrested persons. But the falsely
accused person is likewise in need of protection against the disgrace and
humiliation of being permanently cataloged with felons. Police officials
may exercise their discretion properly and avoid the demand for legislative action. But discretion may be abused, in fact has been so abused
judging by the decided case, so if the legislature has not acted, the
courts should allow relief, as in the instant case, by recognizing an innocent person's right of privacy.
Mrs. D. W. SPINKA

Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, §§ 780a-780g.
23 Iowa Code, § 728.8; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch. 421, § 16-19; R. I. Gen.
1938, Ch. 620, § 7.
24Conn. Gen. Stats. 1941. Ch. 127, §§ 399f-405f; Mason's Minn. Stats.
§ 626.40; Thompson, N. Y. Cons. Laws, Penal Law, § 516; W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 1264(1).
25 Mich. Stat. Ann., Vol. II, Ch. 24, § 4.462 and § 4.463; Page's Ohio Gen.
22

Ann., Vol. II, § 1841-18; Vt. Pub. Laws 1933,

§ 5503.
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INSURANCE--EXTENT

oa

OF LOSS AND LIABILITY OF INSURER-WHETHER

NOT FACT DEATH OCCURRED IN MILITARY SERVICE PRECLUDES RECoVERY

ON LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTAINING MILITARY SERVICE

CLAUSE-The

proper construction to be given to a "war clause", excepting liability
in a life insurance policy, was the prime controversy in the recent case

of Hooker v. New York Life Insurance Company.' Plaintiff there sued
as the beneficiary of an insurance policy upon the life of his son who was
killed by an accidental fall from a cliff during training as a United
States Marine on active duty in New Zealand. Controversy as to the
essential facts of his death was more formal than real. Liability for
double indemnity was denied by the insurance company under an exemption clause that limited liability "if the insured's death resulted directly or indirectly from . . . (d) War or any act incident thereto."

Re-

covery on the policy was allowed on the ground that the insured's death
did not "result" from an act incident to war.
While "war" or "service" exemptions are not against public policy.'
for an insurance company has the right to select the risks it will assume,'
the applicability of any given policy exception is not a question of fact
but a matter of construction for the court.' Courts have been found to
adopt the construction most favorable to the insured,' but at that point
accord ceases. Any apparent conflict is due in a great measure to the
difference in the phraseology of the exemption clauses, but the courts,
in many of these cases, adopting an interpretation against the company,
have gone to some length in taking a particular word or phrase in the

military clause, construing the same as ambiguous, then resolving that
ambiguity as meaning activity of a military nature rather than status,
thereby holding the insurer liable. 6
Three distinct lines of cases may be discerned in the treatment given
by the courts to what may be generically termed "war" or "military"
exemption clauses. The narrowest class is one in which the status of the
insured, present where the clause typically reads "while in military or
166 F. Supp. 313 (1946).
2 Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R.
378 (1919).
' Marks v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 191 Ky. 385, 230 S. W. 540 (1921).
4 Bull v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 141 F. (2d) 456 (1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 723,
65 S.Ct. 55, 89 L. Ed. 581 (1944).
'Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & G. Co., 292 U. S. 80, 54 S. Ct. 590, 78 L.
Ed. 1137 (1934).
6 Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. (2d) 71
(1944).
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naval service", is regarded as the sole criterion. 7 Expounding on such
a clause, the Ohio Appellate Court once said, "This language is clear
and unambiguous. There is nothing to construe. The language plainly
makes status of the insured in military or naval service the ground of
exemption from liability." 8 Nor is the duty status of the insured material,
for the same court indicated that one "is in the military service from
the time he takes the oath until he receives his discharge, honorable or
otherwise.'
Under this type of exemption, then, the only inquiry is
whether the insured was in military or naval service at the time his
death or disability was incurred ;1o causation or activity is not a factor. 1
The nature of the activity in which the insured was engaged at the
time of his death or disability forms the basis of the middleground viewpoint adopted by many of the courts, 2 a viewpoint which incorporates
7 The following cases, involving interpretation of the quoted clauses, are illustrative: Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7
A. L. R. 378 (1919), ("while in the service in the army or navy . . . in time of
war") ; State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harmon, 72 Ga. App. 117, 33 S. E. (2d) 105 (1945),

("under enrollment in any branch of military or naval service in time of war") ;
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S. E. (2d) 871 (1943),
("while enrolled in military or naval service in time of war") ; Bradshaw v.
Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332, 11 A. L. R. 1091
(1920), ("shall engage in military or naval service in time of war") ; Ruddock v.
Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920), ("enter or be engaged in
such [military or naval] service") ; Slaughter v. Protective League Life Ins. Co.,
205 Mo. App. 352, 223 S. W. 819 (1920); ("while engaged in military or naval service in time of war"); Olson v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. of North Dakota, 48 N. D.
285, 184 N. W. 7 (1921), ("engage in occupation of soldier in time of war").
8 Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. (2d) 71 (1944).
9 74 Ohio App. 182 at 191, 58 N. E. (2d) 71 at 75.
1o Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R.
(1919); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 70 Ga. App. 181, 27 S. E. (2d) 871
(1943); Olson v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. of North Dakota, 48 N. D. 285, 184 N. W.
7 (1921) ; Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N. E. (2d)
71 (1944).
11 Bradshaw v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332
(1920).
12 Illustrative of this class are the following cases: Benham v. American Central
Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462 (1919), ("engaged in military or naval
service in time of war, or in consequence of such service"); Long v. St. Joseph
Life Ins. Co., 225 S. W. (Mo. App.) 106 (1920), affirmed in - Mo. -, 248 S. W.
923 (1923), ("while engaged in any military or naval service in time of war");
Reid v. American Nat. Assur. Co., 204 Mo. App. 643, 218 S. W. 957 (1920), ("engage
in military or naval service in time of war") ; Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., 202
Mo. App. 499, 213 S. W. 877 (1919), ("engage in military or naval service and die
while so engaged") ; Myli v. American Life Ins. Co., 43 N. D. 495, 175 N. W. 631,
11 A. L. R. 1097 (1919), ("while engaged in military or naval service in time of
war") ; Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 226 P. 101 (1924),
("while in the service in the army or navy in time of war") ; Barnett v. Merchants'
Life Ins. Co., 87 Okla. 42, 280 P. 271 (1922), ("engage in military service in time
of war") ; Young v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 204 S. C. 386, 29 S. E.
(2d) 482 (1944), ("while insured is in military or naval service in time of war") ;
West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. (2d) 475 (1943),
("engaged in military or naval service in time of war") ; Kelly v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152, 4 A. L. R. 845 (1919), ("engage in military service in connection with actual warfare and shall die as result").
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some aspects of status and some of causation.13 When denying operative
effect to an exemption which read "While engaged in any military or
naval service in time of war" in a case where the insured died of natural
causes while home on furlough, a Missouri court once said, "If insured's
mere status of being an enlisted soldier or sailor at the time of his death
is to give effect to the clause and reduce liability, what necessity existed
for saying therein that death must occur while insured is 'engaged' in
any such service.? As applied to military or naval service, the word
'engaged' denotes action or participation in something done in that
service. By putting the word 'engaged' in the exemption clause, the
idea is conveyed that death must occur while insured is participating or
taking part in that service in some way, and not merely during the period
he occupies the status of being a soldier or sailor.' '14
In discussing causation under a similar clause, an Arkansas court
stated, "In the case at bar the insured died from influenza, and the record
shows that this disease was prevalent throughout the United States, and
that soldiers and civilians alike contracted it. The death of the insured,
then, was in no sense caused by performing any military service, or in
consequence of being engaged in military service. '15 The inquiry in
cases of this character, then, includes not only an investigation as to the
insured's status and his activity within that service,"6 but also as to
causal factors17 peculiar to military service18 in order to determine the
effect to be given to the exception.' 9
The third group of cases turns on the causal relation between the
military and naval service, or war, and the death or disability of the
13 See Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462
(1919), Malone v. State Life Ins. Co., 202 Mo. App. 499, 213 S. W. 877 (1919), and
Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins..Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152 (1919), for examples of the incorporation of this dual nature in the very clause itself.
14 Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 225 S. W. (Mo. App.) 106 at 107 (1920).
15 Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612 at 618, 217 S. W. 462
at 463 (1919). Italics added.
16 Whether the insured was on leave or furlough, or was performing military or
naval duties, become matters of consequence.
17 Pertinent questions are: Did the death or disability result from the service?
Was it a disease common to civilian and military alike? Was accidental death, like
an auto accident, common to both civilian and military alike? Was death within
the extra risk occasioned by military or naval service?
isSee Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152 (1919),
where the court limited the exception to a cause "peculiar to military service,"
recovery was allowed for the death of insured when a motorcycle skidded 100 miles
from the front lines in France, insured being a messenger carrying dispatches at
the time.
19 Young v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 204 S. C. 386, 29 S.E. (2d)
282 (1944), permitted recovery for death growing out of an auto accident while on
furlough, on the ground that the exemption was not arbitrary, not status, but was
designed to eliminate the extra risks arising while insured is in military service.
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deceased, 20 which death or disability must result from such service 21 or
from war, 22 as in the instant case, before the exemption clause becomes
effective. Thus, as was pointed out in Gorder v. Lincoln National Life
Insurance Compny,23 the cause must have some distinctive character

intimately related to the military service and not be a hazard which
would have been insured against had the soldier remained in civilian
life. Phrases such as "result of" or "in consequence of" are typical
earmarks to be watched for in cases falling in this class. But again, the
"result" reasoning is met in the "activity" decisions. Contributing or
25
remote cause is insufficient ;24 it must be the direct cause.
The exemption clause in the instant case26 is clearly within this
latter division and is so analyzed and discussed by the court. "War or
any act incident thereto" doubtless caused the insured's presence in
New Zealand, even to his participating in training maneuvers, but since
the death of the insured occurred in the course of routine training, it
did not result from an act "incident" to war. Causation doctrines have
been succinctly applied to this type of exemption both by the Massachusetts 27 and Federal District courts, 2 but difficulty has been encountered
in defining the term "war."
A recent Iowa case,2" while correctly an20 Cases and clauses in this group are: Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp.
620 (1944), ("death resulting from war or any act incident thereto") ; Eggena v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 530 (1945), ("death resulted
directly or indirectly from war or any act incident thereto") ; Stankus v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. (2d) 687 (1942), ("death resulted directly or
Indirectly from war or any act incident thereto") ; Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514, 11 A. L. R. 1080 (1920), ("death in consequence
of such [military or naval] service without the company's permit") ; Smith v.
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. (2d) 80 (1944), ("if disability
shall result from military or naval service in time of war").
21 See Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920),
and Smith v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. (2d) 808 (1944).
22 Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944).
23 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920).
24 The court in Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944), held that
the death of a naval ensign at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, in the course of the
Japanese sneak attack was accidental. Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46
N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920), held that death from pneumonia in Liverpool
within a week of debarkation from a troop transport was not in consequence of
military service.
25 Smith v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 204 S. C. 193, 28 S. E. (2d) 808 (1944).
But see Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 550
(1945), which denied liability for death when a tank in which insured was riding
crashed from a bridge during training activities in the United States, and the comment thereon in Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 at 317 (1946).
26 The clause read: ". . . if the insured's death resulted, directly or indirectly
from . . . (d) war or any act incident thereto." 66 F. Supp. 313 at 314.
27 Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. (2d) 687 (1942).
28 Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 (1946), and Savage v. Sun
Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944).
29 Eggena v. New York Life Ins. Co., 236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 530 (1945).
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nouncing the problem under the same exemption to be one of causation,
nevertheless misapplies the doctrine ° for it conceives the term "'war"
to refer to a period of time rather than to a causative factor.
But discussion and attempts at classification yield little of practical
value for the lawyer confronted with a similar exemption clause. Excellent and exhaustive annotations 3' and discussions3 2 serve only to
highlight the confusion. Clauses used by the same insurance company
have been held sufficient to exempt in one case in one jurisdiction 3 but
inoperative in another.3 4 A court of the same state, strongly anti-status
when allowing recovery for death from influenza in the United States,"
nevertheless later denied recovery for death from pneumonia in France
on the basis that status, not activity, was the ground of limitation under
almost identical clauses. 6 Even comparable fact situations have been
productive of different results. For example, the death of a seaman on
a United States destroyer, sunk by a torpedo in the North Atlantic in
1941 was held to be "from war", although prior to any formal declaration,3 7 but death during the bombing of Hawaii by Japanese planes was
treated as not "in

time of war. ,,38

Definition and comparison, then, do not resolve the problem, for
there are no well-defined "rules."
Objective analysis demonstrates that
the genesis of the problem lies in the need for judicial construction of
"ambiguous" exemption clauses. The obvious remedial action is to reexamine the verbiage used in the policy, for a concise, clear, complete
exemption should leave no room for ambiguity and consequent construe30 See comment in Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 at 317
(1946).
31 See annotation to West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.
(2d) 475 (1943), in 145 A. L. R. 1461 and the general annotation in 137 A. L. R.
1263 bringing earlier World War I notes down to date. The latter annotations may
be found in 15 A. L. R. 1280, 11 A. L. R. 1091, 7 A. L. R. 378, and 4 A. L. R. 845.
32 Two of the better articles on the subject are: Barton, "The War and Aviation
Clauses in Life Insurance Policies," 24 Neb. 264 (1945), and Rively, "War Clauses
in Life Insurance Policies," 46 Dick. L. Rev. 192 (1942). See also comment on
Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944), in 25 Bost. U. L. Rev. 289
(1945).
33 Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310 (1919).
34 Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302, 226 P. 101 (1924).
35 Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 46 N. D. 192, 180 N. W. 514 (1920).
36 Olson v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. of North Dakota, 48 N. D. 285, 184 N. W. 7
(1921).
37 Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N. E. (2d) 687 (1942).
38 Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co.. 57 F. Supp. 620 (1944) ; Rosenau v. Idaho Mut.
Ben. Ass'n, 65 Ida. 408, 145 P. (2d) 227 (1944) ; and West v. Palmetto State Life
Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25 S. E. (2d) 475 (1943). all permit recovery for deaths
incurred during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
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tion. Certainty of exemption would not only benefit both insured and
insurer but would minimize the need for judicial construction.3
It is obviously impossible, however, to re-write exemption clauses
in the course of current litigation. But careful and accurate analysis
and presentation of the problem from the standpoint of the purpose of
the exemption clause, 0 where construction may be necessary, should avoid
further chaos that might arise from attempting to match definitions or
from the comparison of verbiage. Correct analysis should first involve
an inquiry as to whether any construction is necessary; not whether the
clause can possibly be made ambiguous. If the clause is fairly and
objectively ambiguous, however, that ambiguity should be resolved, upon
careful analysis of the exemption, in terms of status, activity, or result.
Particularly to be avoided is the "rewriting" of the clause in terms of
another exemption. When analyzing the exemption, primary attention
should be given to the exemption as a whole, viewed in its entirety. If
it appears, after fair consideration, that statics or activity of the insured,
in contrast to disability resulting from service of war, is the basis of
avoidance of liability, the ordinary rules for each class may then be
applied to achieve a final determination as to whether or not the death
or disability occurred within or without the particular exemption.
W. 0. KROHN

LANDLORD AND TENANT-RE-ENTRY

AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

BY

LANDLORD--WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FORCIBLE DETAINER

IS IN TRUSTEE OR IN BENEFICIARY OF A LAND TRusT-The case of Liberty
National Bank of Chicago v. Kosterlitz1 presented a novel problem con-

cerning the respective rights of a trustee and a beneficiary under a land
trust to maintain an action for forcible entry and detainer; a problem
made more complicated because of the existence of certain regulations
promulgated by the Office of Price Administration. Title to the premises

involved had been vested in the plaintiff, as trustee, under a typical land
trust agreement which declared that the right of the beneficiary was
simply one of personal property nature and gave him no legal or equitable
interest in the real estate. The defendant had been a tenant from month
39 Changing methods of warfare, new means of starting or "declaring" war, as
well as increased civilian participation in war activities pose additional problems
for the framers of exemption clauses.
40 1. e., was the purpose to avoid liability for any death; for death from any reason all the time insured is a soldier, sailor, or marine; only for the extra hazard
while insured is actively performing military duties; or for death occurring as a
result of military duties; or for death from an act of war, even as applied to
civilians; or for death from any other specific hazard?
1329 Ill. App. 244, 67 N. E. (2d) 876 (1946).
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to month, had been served with notice of termination of tenancy by the
beneficiary acting as agent for the trustee, and, upon failure to vacate,
had been sued for possession of the premises by the trustee under authority
of a certificate of eviction issued by OPA in the name of the beneficiary.
Summary judgment in the trial court in favor of plaintiff was reversed
on appeal by defendant on the ground that the trustee, although possessed
of the right to sue under local law, lacked the necessary authority under
OPA regulations in the absence of a certificate issued in the name of the
trustee, and the existence of such a certificate favoring the beneficiary of
the trust was of no consequence since the latter could have no right of
action under local law.
As the existence of a proper OPA certificate issued in the name of
the plaintiff would seem, by the decision, to be an essential prerequisite
to an action for possession and not just a mere procedural technicality,'
the first question presented is whether or not such a certificate could be
obtained by one who merely holds title in trust for another. The rent
regulations presently direct that such certificate shall be issued to the
"landlord" upon compliance with certain requirements not here material,
and the term "landlord" is therein defined to be "an owner, lessor,
sublessor, assignee or other person receiving or entitled to receive rent
for the use or occupancy of any housing accommodations or an agent of
any of the foregoing."I While no construction has been given to these
provisions by the courts as yet, it would seem that a person vested with
the rights and powers ordinarily conferred upon a trustee should be
entitled to have such a certificate. In Wahl v. Schmidt,4 for example,
it was indicated that, at least in a court of law, a trustee holding the
legal title together with the right to possession was to be regarded as
"owner" of the premises, having all the rights and subject to all the
liabilities attaching to ownership. Whether a trustee can be said to be
a person "entitled to receive rent" for the premises, so as to come within
the definition of "landlord," is, however, a matter entirely dependent
upon the terms of the trust agreement. If the agreement, as in the instant
case, gives to the beneficiary the control of the management of the
property, including renting thereof and the collection and handling of
rents, a strict construction of the regulation in question would lead to
the conclusion that the trustee, while holder of the legal title, is not a
person "receiving or entitled to receive rent" from the premises, hence
20. P. A. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 28, § 6(B) (2) (1), requires the purchaser of rented premises desiring to occupy the same personally to obtain such a
certificate before pursuing his remedies under local law to oust the tenant.
3 Ibid., § 13(a).
4 307 Ill. 331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923).
See also, Randolph v. Hinck, 288 Il. 99, 123
N. E. 273 (1919).
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could not procure the necessary certificate.' If so, and the necessary
certificate is to be issued solely to the beneficiary, the problem then becomes
one as to whether or not the beneficiary may maintain the action, for if
he cannot and the trustees cannot get the requisite certificate it would
seem that the resulting stalemate would prevent ouster of the tenant.
The prime issue in every action for forcible entry and detainer is
one concerning the right to possession,6 for questions concerning title
are immaterial 7 and may not be determined therein.8 That it is the right
to possession which must be emphasized is borne out by the cases which
hold that it is the lessee who should sue the hold-over tenant 9 rather than
the lessor, since the latter, after lease granted, no longer has the right
to possession. 10 If the beneficiary can be said to enjoy the right to possess
and likewise holds the requisite certificate, it would seem to follow that
the action can be successfully maintained by him, provided he sues in
his own name but in his capacity as beneficiary. Recourse to the trust
instrument will be necessary to establish the beneficiary's right to
possession so careful analysis of its terms would be highly desirable. The
court in the instant case, although by way of dictum, indicated that the
common provisions found in the usual land trust agreement" gave the
5 The court in the instant case concluded that the declaration in the trust agreement that the beneficiary's interest was solely personal property overrode the provisions therein regarding management, so as to prevent the beneficiary from being
"landlord" to the defendant: 329 Ill. App. 244 at 246, 67 N. E. (2d) 876 at 877.
It is understood that the Regional Office of the Chicago Defense Rental Area, perhaps on the theory that if the beneficiary is not "landlord" then the trustee must
be, has now issued a certificate of eviction in the name of the trustee, plaintiff in
the instant case.
6 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 57, § 2. See also Biebel Roofing Co. v. Pritchett, 373 Ill.
214, 25 N. E. (2d) 800 (1940) ; West Side Tr. & Say. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631,
193 N. E. 462 (1934).
7 Palmer v. Frank, 169 Ill.
90, 48 N. E. 426 (1897).
553, 30 N. E. (2d) 52 (1940).
8 Davis v. Robinson, 374 Ill.
9 Allen v. Webster, 56 Ill. 393 (1870) ; Travis v. Geiger, 215 Ill. App. 461 (1919)
Geo. J. Cooke Co. v. Kaiser, 163 Il. App. 210 (1911).
1O Gazzolo v. Chambers, 73 Ill. 75 (1874).

11 The instant agreement provided, among other things, that "the interest of any
beneficiary hereunder shall consist solely of a power of direction to deal with the
title of said property and to manage and control said property as hereinafter provided. and the right to receive the proceeds from rentals and from mortgages, sales
or other disposition of said premises, and that such right in the avails of said
property shall be deemed to be personal property, and may be assigned and transferred as such . . . and that no beneficiary now has, and that no beneficiary hereunder at any time shall have any right, title or interest in or to any portion of said
real estate as such, either legal or equitable, but only an interest in the earnings,
avails and proceeds as aforesaid." It also provided that the "beneficiary or beneficiaries hereunder, in his, her or their own right shall have the management of
said property and control of the selling, renting and handling thereof, and shall
collect and handle the rents, earnings, avails and proceeds thereof, and said trustee
shall have no duty in respect to such management or control, or the collection,
handling or application of such rents, earnings, avails or proceeds, or in respect to
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beneficiary no rights in the real estate or its possession since the beneficiary
had nothing which could be made the subject of a lease to a tenant unless
any lease negotiated by the beneficiary was made by him as agent for
the trustee. It cited only one case in support of that view, that of Chicago
Title & Trust Company v. Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank,12 which
case is not squarely in point for the issue there was whether or not a
judgment against a beneficiary was superior to the lien of a mortgage
subsequently executed by the trustee. No question of the right of the
beneficiary to possession of the premises was involved therein, hence the
support from such a case is slender. The inference to be drawn from
other cases, also involving land trusts of the type here concerned, wherein
the trustee has been isolated from liability for personal injury to persons
coming on the premises because of absence of possession, control or
management,13 would seem to dictate an opposite conclusion.
The suggested conflict between these decisions makes the instant case
even more unique, for if credit is given to both views then neither trustee
nor beneficiary has the right to possession. As all the rights incident to
property ownership were once vested in the settlor of such a trust, he
must have, by the terms of the conveyance and the trust indenture,
transferred them to the trustee and the beneficiary jointly or divided
such rights between them. If the beneficiary is also the settlor, as here,
the agreement would not confer rights on him but such rights would
be regarded as reserved unless clearly given to the trustee. 1 4 It cannot
be supposed that the beneficiary, having been given the right or having
reserved the right to manage and control the property, including the
renting and handling thereof, acts simply as agent for the trustee, 5
so it should follow that such a beneficiary is vested with the right to
possession unless the arrangement indicates the contrary. If the trustee
is charged with the duty of management, it could well be implied that
possession should be vested in him"5 in order that such duty might be
the payment of taxes or assessments or in respect to insurance, litigation or otherwise, except on written direction as hereinabove provided, and after the payment to
it of all money necessary to carry out said instructions." Such provisions are believed to be typical of trust agreements covering land in the Chicago area.
12 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N. E. (2d) 992 (1939).
13 Brazowski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 280 Ill. App. 293, leave to appeal denied
280 Il.

App. xiii (1935), noted in 13 CHIOAGo-KENT RE'vriw 383; Whitaker v. Cen-

tral Trust Co., 270 Ill. App. 614 (1933), abst. opin.
14 Irish v. Antioch College, 126 Ill. 474, 18 N. E. 768 (1888) ; Equitable Trust Co.
v. Fisher, 106 Ill. 189 (1883).
App. 39 (1925).
15 Gallagher & Speck v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 238 Ill.
16 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1. § 329. See also Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66,
99 N. E. 360, Ann. Cas. 1913D 143 (1912) ; MNcDale v. Shepardson, 53 Ill.App. 513

(1893), appeal dismissed 156 Ill. 383, 40 N. E. 953 (1895); Williamson v. Wilkins,
14 Ga. 416 (1854) ; Ellis v. Woodruff, 88 Kan. 734, 129 P. 1193 (1913).
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performed, but if the plain intention is otherwise all such considerations
must give .way17 unless the parties, by their conduct, have furnished their
8
own interpretation of the situation.1
These views are not affected by such decisions as that in Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company v. Windsor Amusement Company,'9 for the court there relied upon a special provision, not typically
found in land trust agreements, to the effect that "the trustee is the sole
owner . . . and so far as the public is concerned has full power to
deal" with the property, as warranting suit for possession by the trustee
against a hold-over tenant. The term "public" in such provision was
held to include persons in the defendant's position, but without such
clause it is doubtful if that result would have been obtained. The holding
in Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee Railway Company v. Chicago Title
& Trust Company,20 a condemnation action in which it was regarded as
unnecessary to make the beneficiary a party defendant because the trust
agreement declared his interest to be personal property only, is likewise
not controlling for the agreement there gave the power of management
to a third person.
The law can well be assumed to be, therefore, that the right to
possession may be in the beneficiary and that he, by virtue of such right,
is entitled to bring a forcible entry and detainer action to recover
possession of trust premises. The instant case, however, does serve as a
warning that care must be exercised in undertaking such an action as
J. P. RAUScmRT
to real estate held in trust.

17 For cases where, by express language in the trust agreement, the beneficiary
was given the right to possession, see: Lethbridge v. Lethbridge, 3 DeG. F. & J.
523, 45 Eng. Rep. 981 (1861); Freeman v. Cook, 14 N. C. 373 (1848); Lewis v.
Henry's Ex'ors, 69 Va. (28 Grat.) 192 (1877). See also Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,
Vol. 3, § 583. For cases where, from the surrounding circumstances, it could be said
that the beneficiary had the right to possession, see: Glover v. Stamps, 73 Ga. 209
(1884) ; Fernstler v. Seiberg, 114 Pa. 196, 6 A. 165 (1886) ; School Directors v.
Dunkleberger, 6 Pa. (Burr) 29 (1847).
18 The record in the instant case would indicate that rent, after attornment, had
been paid by checks made payable to the trustee and all requisite notices, etc., had
been given by the beneficiary as agent for the trustee. Such conduct may serve to
disclose that the parties themselves regarded the trustee as the one having the right
to possession. If so, the court's statement that the beneficiary had no right to sue
must be regarded as being correct under the circumstances.
19 288 Ill. App. 57, 5 N. E. (2d) 606 (1936).
20 328 Ill. 610, 160 N. E. 226 (1928).
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the recent Ohio

case of Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Company,' plaintiff was an
unemployed union carpenter drawing benefits under the local Unemployment Compensation Act.2 Being able to work and available for work,
as required by the pertinent provision of the statute,3 he was referred to
a nonunion job as a carpenter. He refused the proffered employment
on the ground that, as acceptance of the nonunion job would violate the
rules of his union, 4 and would subject him to expulsion, 5 he was excused
from accepting the employment by a statutory provision 6 which provided
that an individual shall not lose the right to benefits by reason of a
refusal to accept new work, if, "as a condition of being so employed,"
he would be denied the right to retain his membership in the union and
to observe its lawful rules. The Board of Review of the Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation interpreted "condition" to refer to restrictions and qualifications contained in the offer of employment made
by the employer to the prospective employee, and did not mean "result"
of being so employed as plaintiff contended. From an order suspending
the employment benefits, plaintiff appealed to the Common Pleas Court,.
where the order of the administrative tribunal was affirmed. The Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause,7 and the
case came before the Ohio Supreme Court upon motion to certify the
record of the intermediate court. The Supreme Court, two justices
dissenting, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed
that of the Common Pleas on the ground that "condition," as used in
the statute, was the equivalent of "requisite" or "requirement," and
1 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N. E. (2d) 439 (1946). Zimmerman, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Bell, J.
2 Ohio Gen. Code, § 1345-1 et seq., 119 Ohio Laws 836.
3 Ibid., § 1345-6 a (4).
4 § 7,
C of the trade rules of the local union provided that no members "will be
permitted to work on jobs where nonunion carpenters are working, or for employer

[sic] who employs nonunion carpenters." See 146 Ohio St. 559 at 560, 67 N. E. (2d)
439 at 440.
5 The union rules provided that any "officer or member who wilfully ... violates
the trade rules of the locality in which he is working .. . may be fined, suspended
or expelled, as the local union may decide." See 146 Ohio St. 559 at 560, 67 N. E.
(2d) 439 at 440.
6 Ohio Gen. Code, § 1345-6a(1), 119 Ohio Laws 836, declares that "No individual
otherwise qualified to receive benefits shall lose the right to benefits by reason of a
refusal to accept new work if: (1) As a condition of being so employed, he would
be required to join a company union, or to resign from or refrain from joining any
bonafide labor organization, or would be denied the right to retain membership in
and observe the lawful rules of any such organization."
7 44 Ohio Law Abs. 146, 62 N. E. (2d) 496 (1945).
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that to hold otherwise would permit the statute to operate in an unconstitutional manner through the discrimination that would result by
granting benefits to a union worker while denying them to a nonunion
worker under similar circumstances.
State unemployment laws generally provide that an individual, to
be eligible for benefits, must be able to work and must be available for
work; and that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits if he has
failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work when the same is
offered. A clause usually enumerates a number of factors which shall
be considered when determining the suitability of work. In addition
to these, all state laws contain a clause, corresponding to the so-called
"labor standards provision" of the Internal Revenue Code," which in
substance provides that "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
Act, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied
under this Act to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept
new work .

.

.

(c)

if as a condition of being employed the individual

would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from joining any bona fide labor organization. "9
One author, when interpreting this provision, has stated that where
the employee would be forced to resign from a union, he would not be
disqualified from receiving benefits if he refused the employment; but
where he would be expelled from tho union, disqualification will follow,
for the expulsion is a result of, and is not required as a condition to,
being employed. He has recommended, however, that regardless of the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the union rule, a finding should
be made that the individual had good cause for refusing the employment,
since loss of status is a substantial harm to him.'"
The decision in Barclay White Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review" accords with this recommendation, for the claimant
there, referred to a job as a ship's carpenter, refused the employment
after notice by the secretary-treasurer of the union that acceptance of the
referral would result in the member's suspension. It was held that
although the work was suitable within the meaning of the act, the
claimant refused it with good cause and was therefore not disqualified
from benefits. The court said that the rights which membership in a
union confers upon its members constitute property so valuable that
equity will restrain against their impairment.
826 U. S. C. A. § 1603(a) (5).
9 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 223(c) (2).
:LOA. M. Menard, "Refusal of Suitable Work," 55 Yale L. J. 134 (1945), particularly p. 143.
11 Pa. Super. Ct., 1946, CCH Unemployment Insurance Service 8140.
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Of a contrary tenor, however, is the decision in Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission.12 There, plaintiff, an unemployed union
painter, declined a nonunion job and justified his refusal, among other
reasons, by reliance on the non-disqualification clause in the Delaware
Act. He contended that the words "condition of being employed" should
be interpreted to mean a condition which inheres in the entering upon
or carrying out of the employment, as distinguished from a condition
imposed by an employer. The court, holding the employment to be
suitable and denying compensation, said that the interpretation sought
by the plaintiff could not be attained by judicial construction, but that
resort must be had to legislative sanction. It also pointed out that the
phrases "resign from" and "expelled from" are not analogous, but
opposed to each other.
In a number of other instances, courts in passing upon the justification of a refusal to work, have as a rule denied benefits on the ground
Thus in Huiet v. Schwob
that the claimant was not available for work."3
Manufacturing Company" the claimant left her job to follow her husband
to a military camp, where she was unsuccessful in finding employment.
Upon notice of a claim for benefits, her former employer advised that
her former position was still open. She refused to return and was
disqualified on the ground that she was not available for employment
previously held. In Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation.
Commission15 the applicant was a married woman who had been employed
on the third shift. Desiring to devote some time to her family, she
refused to work on shifts other than the first or second. The court held
that limited availability for work disqualified her from benefits. Likewise in Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc.,16 the applicant, a member of
the orthodox Jewish faith, refused Saturday employment and was disqualified from benefits on the ground that he was not available for work.
These latter cases illustrate the decision that may be expected when
the refusal is a matter of independent choice and is not dictated by
considerations imposed from without. In the instant case, however, the
plaintiff was not at liberty to accept the nonunion employment without
risk of serious consequences. In view of the fact that courts have upheld
the right of labor unions to prohibit their members from working with
12

46 A. (2d) (Del. Super. Ct.) 137 (1946).

13 See the cases collected in an annotation to Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Cor-

poration, 219 Minn. 306, 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (1945) to be found in 158 A. L. R. 396.
14 196 Ga. 855, 27 S. E. (2d) 743 (1943).
15 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535 (1944).
16 76 Ohio App. 51, 63 N. E. (2d) 218 (1945), noted in 24 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
Rm'IEw 281 (1946).
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nonunion men and to enforce such rules through fines or expulsion,

7

it is submitted that the result reached by the instant case is not satisfactory from the hapless employee's standpoint, for he is, as it were,
caught in the middle between conflicting alternatives. The court, it
seems, could well find that, whether the loss of union status is demanded
as a condition of employment or comes as a result of the employment,
the employee had good cause for refusing the tendered work. The only
other alternative is to deny the power of unions to make and to enforce
rules prohibiting their members from accepting nonunion employment.
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act' s contains a non-disqualification clause
similar to the federal labor standards provision. 19 Although not judicially
construed as yet, the decision of the Board of Review in the matter of
Dunbar v. Biggs 20 is typical. There, the claimant, a steam fitter, was
referred to a contractor who had not qualified under the rules of the
union to which the employee belonged. Informed by his union that he
would be subject to disciplinary action if he accepted the employment,
the claimant did not report for work. It was held that there was good
cause for refusing the work, for the principle seems to be established in
Illinois, at least to the Director's satisfaction, that work is not suitable
if its acceptance will jeopardize the employee's union relations, especially
where the main reliance for a livelihood is placed on such an affiliation.
However, since the most recent employer is a party to the determination
of the claimant's eligibility for benefits, 21 and can appeal to the courts
22
from an adverse ruling after his administrative remedies are exhausted,
the matter may yet be made the basis of judicial determination in this
state.2 3
J. E. GALT

17 Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', etc., Local U. No. 1, 92 Conn. 161,
101 A. 659, 6 A. L. R. 887 (1917); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582,
Ann. Cas. 1918D 661 (1917).
1a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 217 et seq.
19 Ibid., § 223(c) (2).
20 See Decision No. 46-BRD-425 (46-RD-1800), May 2, 1946.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 225(b).
22 Ibid., § 230.
2.3 The employer in Biggs v. Dunbar is now seeking judicial reversal of the decision of the Board of Review. See case No. 46C-7058, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.

